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Abstract. This paper studies a model of corporate ﬁnance in which ﬁrms use stock
issuance to ﬁnance investment. Since the ﬁrm recognizes the relationship between future
dividends and stock prices, future variables enter in the constraints and optimal policy
is in general time inconsistent. We discuss the nature of time inconsistency and show
that it arises because managers promise to incorporate value maximization gradually into
their objective function. This shows how one could change managers’ incentives in order
to enforce the optimal contract under full commitment. We then characterize several
cases where time consistency arises and we study diﬀerent examples where policy is time
inconsistent. This allows us to address some outstanding issues in the literature about
dividend policy and equity issuance. In particular, our results suggest that growing ﬁrms
that can credibly commit will pay lower dividends at the beginning and promise higher
dividends in the future, consistent with empirical evidence. Our results also suggests
that compensation that is tied to stock options creates incentives to inﬂate prices and
pay lower dividends. This is consistent with the empirical evidence of increased stock
option compensation and payout through repurchases instead to dividends during the
last decades.
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11. Introduction
The study of consumers’ savings and portfolio choices in dynamic stochastic models has pro-
gressed enormously in the last thirty years. However, modelling ﬁrms’ savings and portfolio
choices in a dynamic framework has received less attention. Issues on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing have
been often assumed away, sometimes by the introduction of complete markets, sometimes by
simply assuming that consumers take the decision of how much physical capital to accumu-
late. This situation is unsatisfactory, since the form of ﬁnancing matters for the equilibrium
quantities under incomplete markets, and we know that consumers do not actually decide on
the ﬁrm’s investment. Moreover, issues such as stocks repurchases, dividend payments, and
their interaction with investment cannot be analyzed in such a framework. There is a large
empirical literature on ﬁrm ﬁnancing, but it often lacks explicit dynamic modelling, making
it hard to formulate hypotheses to be tested with time series data.
Some papers have started to close this gap and explicit modelling has been used to
address issues such as ﬁrm dynamics in an inﬁnite horizon setting or the eﬀects of ﬁnancing
frictions on investment (see e.g. Hopenhayn (1992), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Covas and
Den-Haan (2007), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004), Quadrini and Jermann (2005),
Gomes (2000, 2003)). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by focusing on equity
ﬁnancing and dividend policy in a dynamic setting.
Our work diﬀers from the previous literature in several aspects. First, since the focus
is on equity ﬁnancing, we abstract from the debt/equity choice. The choice of the ﬁrm is,
then, about how many stocks to issue (or repurchase), how much to pay out as dividends and
how much to invest. Second, most dynamic analyses of ﬁnancial policy share the common
features of ruling out repurchases and obtaining the pecking order theory. In this setting,
the pecking order theory would imply that ﬁrms will use outside equity only if internal funds
are not enough to ﬁnance the optimal level of investment. As a consequence, ﬁrms will not
increase dividends while they are issuing equity. Given the empirical implausibility of this
result, we focus on cases under which the pecking order theory does not hold. To do this,
we introduce ﬁnancing frictions and consider diﬀerent ﬁrm objectives under which managers
are in conﬂict with the objective of market investors. These objectives can be interpreted
as diﬀerent managerial compensations and one way to theoretically rationalize them is to
consider them as a reduced form agency issues, which we do not model explicitly.
We ﬁrst point out the following. A ﬁrm that is deciding how much equity to sell (or
repurchase) in a competitive stock market and, simultaneously, how much dividends to pay
should recognize that the stock market imposes a mapping from future dividends to current
stock prices, namely, that stock prices equal the discounted sum of dividends. We label
this relationship the price-dividend mapping (PD mapping henceforth). Put diﬀerently, a
rational ﬁrm understands that future dividends inﬂuence the current stock price and thus
constrain how much funding can be obtained and therefore how much can be invested by
issuing stocks today. The literature has avoided considering this link by assuming value
maximization as a ﬁrm objective and/or very particular ﬁnancing frictions. In these cases,
the PD mapping does not constraint the ﬁrm’s investment choice but we show that it does
so in general.
As is well known, if future decision variables (in this case future dividends) constrain
today’s choices, the problem of the ﬁrm might not be recursive in the natural state variables,
standard dynamic programming does not apply and the Bellman equation does not hold.
The problem of the ﬁrm is then of a similar nature to a problem of optimal macroeconomic
policy and the optimal solution is generally time inconsistent. Usually, the reason for time
inconsistency is that a manager who needs equity ﬁnancing will promise to pay high dividends
in the future to buyers of newly issued stock. Later on, however, if the manager could
reoptimize, he will have an incentive to lower current dividend and promise high dividends
in the future. In this way the manager can fund current investment and the future high
2dividends drive the stock price up today. This gives rise to a number of issues on how to
formulate and solve the model and how to apply it in several setups.
The ﬁrst issue to address is of a technical nature, since standard dynamic programming
is not appropriate. Using the approach recursive lagrangeans in Marcet and Marimon (2009)
the model is formulated recursively by adding the sum of past lagrange multipliers as a co-
state variable. This recursive formulation facilitates numerical solutions, theoretical analysis
and it provides insights as to the nature of time inconsistency. In particular, it shows that
the objective that implements the full commitment solution will compensate the manager
according to his own objective function but it will also assign a time-varying weight to
the (investors’) objective of value maximization. On the one hand, if a re-optimization is
possible, this formulation illustrates that the manager will have incentives to set the weights
on value maximization to zero. On the other hand, it shows that the "optimal compensation"
enforcing the full commitment policy would have to incorporate gradually the objective of
investors into the managers’ objective.1
We argue that the lack of recursivity and the time inconsistency problem is a very general
feature arising in most setups in which a ﬁrm uses stock issuance to ﬁnance its investment.
Similarly, it would also arise if a ﬁrm uses stock repurchases to distribute proﬁts to the
stockholders. We then show that time consistency can be recovered in the following cases:
a) there is agreement between managers and shareholders (value maximization) or b) the
manager is compensated only with cash ﬂows. These results are useful to a researcher who
wishes to ignore issues of time consistency. This researcher can set up his/her model as one
of these special cases and, using our results, can use the standard set of state variables that
are dictated by the Bellman equation.
The previous ﬁndings complement the literature on ﬁrm dynamics and ﬁnancing frictions
mentioned earlier, where the PD mapping is not mentioned in spite of the fact that ﬁrms
use equity issuance. At ﬁrst sight it might look as though these papers consider ﬁrms that
ignore the PD mapping. Instead, they assume value maximization and fall therefore into
the categories mentioned above where the issue of time inconsistency is absent.2 While
these models derive important implications of ﬁnancing frictions for investment, analyzing
ﬁnancial policy with value maximizing ﬁrms is very limiting. First, from an empirical point
of view, the papers imply a pecking order result: ﬁrms ﬁnance their investment by only
issuing equity in the initial periods and only later pay dividends. As mentioned before, this
behavior is not validated by observed ﬁrm behavior, since many ﬁrms actually pay dividends
and issue stocks in the same period.3 Second, from a theoretical point of view, the literature
on general equilibrium and production with incomplete markets (see McGill and Quinzii
(1996) for a compendium) has pointed out that value maximization might not be agreed
upon heterogeneous shareholders and it is therefore not a universally valid principle.4 In
other words, many issues of interest can only be addressed if there is a conﬂict of interest
between managers and investors.
1There is a vast literature where the optimal compensation contract is explicitly modelled and a recently
growing literature studies this in dynamic contexts (see e.g. Danthine and Donaldson (2008), Atkeson and
Cole (2005), DeMarzo et al (2008) or Cooley et al (2009))
2Many macro models have assumed a ﬁxed dividend rule (for example, dividends equal earnings) or they
have assumed no equity issuance. Of course, the issues we discuss do not arise in these models, since the PD
mapping plays no role under these restrictions.
3This poses no direct problem to the results in the papers just mentioned, since they focus on the behavior
of ﬁrms’ investment.
4This literature has proposed various alternatives to determine endogenously the objective function of the
ﬁrm. Some of the ﬁrst proposed solution concepts were by Drèze (1994) and Grossman and Hart (1979). We
take from this literature the observation that value maximization is not to arise as a natural objective of the
ﬁrm so that, according to our results, time inconsistency is likely to arise in equity ﬁnancing setups. Unlike
this literature, however, we assume a certain objective of the ﬁrm, although in the examples we consider we
do check that the environment justiﬁes the objective assumed.
3Finally, we use our setup to analyze several examples that diﬀer in the manager’s com-
pensation and the source of disagreement between managers and shareholders. We ﬁrst
consider a simple case of internal versus external investors. We assume that an internal
investor controls the ﬁrm by holding a suﬃcient amount of stocks, acts as manager and
ﬁnances investment by selling equity to investors. To capture the idea that the manager’s
interests are closely linked to the ﬁrm we assume that his/her only income comes from the
dividend yield of his/her shares. To capture the idea that investors draw income from many
sources we assume they are risk-neutral. We ﬁnd that with enough transaction costs, the
optimal policy for a growing ﬁrm that can credibly commit is to pay low dividends in the
initial periods and higher dividends in the future. However, if the ﬁrm cannot commit, such
ap r o ﬁle would not be credible and dividend payments decrease over time. These results
indicate that commitment could be part of the explanation for the observation that growing
ﬁrms pay low dividends.
The previous example can also be interpreted as one where managers are compensated
with stocks. According to the survey by Murphy (1999), however, other important compo-
nents of US CEO compensation include a ﬁxed salary, a bonus linked to performance and
stock options. Given this, we study other examples where the compensation corresponds
to diﬀerent combinations of these. First, we assume that managers are compensated with
bonuses linked to cash ﬂows and a ﬁxed salary component. In the absence of disagreement,
optimal policy is time consistency and we therefore assume that there is a probability that
the manager gets ﬁred every period. This generates a conﬂict of interest between investors
and managers suﬀering from short termism. In this case, if the manager is allowed to reopti-
mize, we show that he will try to lower the optimal capital and pay lower dividends. Finally,
a last example assumes that managers are compensated with bonuses linked to cash ﬂows
as well as one period stock options. In this case, managers have strong incentives to inﬂate
stock prices and reduce the dividend payout, a fact that is consistent with the increase in
stock option compensation and the substitution of dividend payouts with repurchases during
the last decades.
To summarize. Our theoretical results show that time inconsistency is not a problem
when managers agree with the shareholders or when they are compensated only with bonuses
linked to cash ﬂows. However, the previous examples illustrate that small deviations from
cash ﬂow compensation lead to time inconsistency when ﬁrms use equity ﬁnancing. In the
absence of institutions that can enforce full commitment, this could potentially make equity
ﬁnancing very costly, potentially providing an explanation for several empirical regularities.
For example, our framework could partly explain why in some countries (like Germany) there
are relatively new ﬁrms listed in the stock market, while the opposite happens in countries
like the US, where the institutional framework makes the problem of time consistency less
severe through common leverage buyouts.
Our work is related to several other strands in the literature. The link between future
dividends and stock prices is implicitly recognized in the seminal work of Modigliani and
Miller (1961). In their work, ﬁrms realize how their initial value is determined by future
dividend payments and this assumes that ﬁrms understand the PD mapping in period zero.
The diﬀerence is that, in our paper, due to market incompleteness, the PD mapping inﬂuences
choices every period. As to the issue of time inconsistency, the only explicit mention in the
literature of corporate ﬁnance we have found is in Miller and Rock (1985), who study a
two period model with private information. In contrast, our paper assumes full information
but disagreement between stockholders and managers. Given this, our work provides an
alternative channel for the presence of time inconsistency.
There are several issues which our paper does not address. While we compare the solution
with and without commitment for some of our examples, our focus is on the case where ﬁrms
have full commitment. This is obviously an extreme assumption. The alternative is to assume
4that ﬁrms have no commitment and they follow time consistent policies, in which case one
could use the solution techniques designed by Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2007) in a number
of papers on optimal ﬁs c a lp o l i c y .T h i si sa l s oa ne x t r e m eassumption that is not validated
by informal observation, since CEO’s often justify paying lower dividends in a given period
by promising investments and, therefore, future dividends. We believe that the assumption
of full commitment is the most reasonable place to start. The issues of commitment and
how to support it by reputation, institutional design, or manager compensation can only be
even discussed if we have the full commitment solution at hand.
Other important issues we do not address are why dividends are smooth or why dividends
are paid at all. There is a very basic reason why ﬁrms pay dividends in our setup: under
rational expectations and non-bubble prices zero dividends in all periods imply zero stock
prices, so that the ﬁrm would be unable to ﬁnance itself with stock. As to dividend smoothing,
some versions of our model simply impose that ﬁrm managers dislike dividend variability.
This could be thought of as capturing an optimal contract in which the ﬁrm’s board of
directors has solved an agency problem determining that the payout to the manager should
be according to dividend payments or the stock price of the ﬁrm. This has been justiﬁed in
various ways by the literature of hidden information but we take the compensation as given
and discuss other issues. These are all interesting issues that we leave for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the main theoretical results. It formulates the problem recursively under full commitment,
it discusses the nature of time inconsistency and it presents an example with an analytical
solution where a proof of time inconsistency is provided. Section 4 characterizes the cases
under which the solution is time consistent. Section 5 present other examples that diﬀer in
the compensation of the manager. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
We ﬁrst set up a generic model where ﬁrms take into account the PD-mapping. This model
can be taken literally as a partial equilibrium model or the ﬁrm behavior can be embedded
in a general equilibrium setting.
2 . 1 . T h eC h o i c eS e to ft h eM a n a g e r . Time is discrete and indexed by  =0 12Firms
take as given an exogenous stochastic process z ={}
∞
=0.  ∈ R2
+ includes ( ),w h e r e
 is an exogenous market discount factor to be endogeneized later and  is an exogenous
productivity shock that follows a Markov process. As usual,  denotes a possible realization
of  while  denotes histories of z up to period .M o r e o v e r ,Ω denotes the set of possible
histories  and Ω denotes the state space of z.T h eﬁrm has full information and observes
 in period 
Each period, the ﬁrm acquires investment goods and converts them into capital to be used
next period. The ﬁrm produces a good using capital as the only input with the production
function (−1). The price of investment goods is constant and normalized to one. Capital
depreciates at a constant rate  and the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is therefore given by:
 = (−1)+( 1− )−1 −  (1)
where  − (1 − )−1 is gross investment.
Each period, the ﬁrm can obtain external ﬁnancing by issuing new stocks that are traded
at the (per share) stock price . Letting  be the amount of stocks in the ﬁrm, total equity
ﬁnancing received by the ﬁrm at time  is  ( − −1).T h eﬁrm distributes a dividend per
share of  and it can also repurchase stocks. A constraint relating the dividend and price
will be speciﬁed later.
T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e so ft h eﬁrm at each period are capital, stocks issued, dividend and
stock price. Denoting these choice variables by  ≡ (   ),t h eﬁrm chooses sequences
5{}
∞
=0,w h e r ee a c h maps Ω into 4






We introduce incomplete markets in an extreme way by assuming that the ﬁrm can
not issue or hold any asset other than its own stock. In addition it has to pay costs
C ≡ C( −1 ) for a ﬁxed function C. This general formulation encompasses capital ad-
justment costs, ﬁnancial transaction costs of issuing or repurchasing equity, costs of changing
dividends and many other frictions that have been considered in the literature. It will also
include the compensation of the manager when this is given by a ﬁxed function of the ﬁrm’s
performance.
To simplify notation, we deﬁne net cash ﬂows (net of ﬁnancing, adjustment and man-
agerial costs) as 
 =  − C. The previous elements consolidate in the following budget
constraint of the ﬁrm:
−1 +  − (1 − )−1 ≤ (−1)+ ( − −1) − C( −1 ) (2)
or, equivalently,
−1 ≤ 
 +  ( − −1)
in addition to the non negativity constraints  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0.
This formulation implies that a start up ﬁrm can increase its capital in two ways. It can
retain earnings and pay low dividends (internal investment) or it can use equity ﬁnancing
(setting   −1) Each of these options may imply diﬀerent ﬁnancing costs and manager
compensations which are summarized by C. Similarly, in the face of a negative (positive)
shock, the ﬁrm can sustain a level of investment by lowering (increasing) dividends or by
issuing new (repurchasing old) equity. In general, however, the ﬁrm will not be able to
invest optimally, as if it had access to complete markets due to two sources of frictions: i) it
can only accumulate one asset (namely, the ﬁrm’s own stock) and ii) it faces ﬁnancial costs
reﬂected by C. Most aspects of this formulation are in line with the recent literature on
dynamic corporate ﬁnance. While many of the papers in the literature do not have both a
dividend and equity choice, similar costs are introduced.
2.2. The PD Mapping. One fundamental diﬀerence between this paper and the pre-
vious literature is that we include the stock price  in the choice set of the ﬁrm. However,
this choice is not unrestricted. Since the new stocks are purchased by external investors
the manager has to choose combinations of prices and dividends such that the investors will
indeed purchase the stock. We assume that investors purchase the stock if the following
condition holds:
 = +1 (+1 + +1) (3)
Most dynamic stochastic models under rational expectations imply the above relation-
ship, where  is the stochastic discount factor for the marginal investor. Throughout the
paper, we assume that the ﬁr mt a k e st h i sd i s c o u n tf a c t o ra sg i v e n 5. Obviously, the standard
case of risk neutral investors with a constant discount factor corresponds to  =1 .
The ﬁrm also realizes that the transversality condition of the investors’ problem has to
be satisﬁed. Formally, let 
 be the stocks owned by investors, where 
 =  −  and 
are the stocks of the manager, which are assumed to be ﬁxed. The ﬁrm understands that







5This is justiﬁed, for example, if there is a continuum of identical ﬁr m ss u b j e c tt ot h es a m es h o c ko r ,m o r e
generally, if each ﬁrm has a minuscule impact on the consumption of the market stockholders.
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As usual, this transversality condition requires that the ﬁrm chooses a path for prices
and stocks that satisﬁes one of two conditions. Either the stock price grows at a rate lower
than the inverse of the discount factor or the number of stocks in the hands of investors
goes to zero. In other words, under the above constraint, the ﬁrm understands that it could
aﬀord to never pay dividends, but in this case the ﬁrm would have to compromise to retire
all stock outstanding suﬃciently fast by setting lim→∞ 
+ =0 . T h i si sb e c a u s ew i t h
zero dividends (3) would imply that the stock price goes to inﬁnity at the rate −1 so that
in order for (4) to hold the ﬁrm has to repurchase eventually all stock.
In the remainder of the paper, we only consider cases where the ﬁrm never repurchases all
of the stock that has been previously issued. We make this assumption so that the stock price
is the discounted present value of dividends. This is assumed for simplicity. In principle, we
could impose (3) and (4) directly, but this would complicate the analysis. More precisely,
we assume the ﬁrm acts as though a constraint:

 ≥  (5)
holds for all periods, for some positive .S o m e ﬁrms in the real world do not behave in
this way and indeed internal investors sometimes repurchase all the ﬁr m ’ ss t o c ki no r d e r
to avoid interferences from outside investors. But this does not happen very often. Once
a ﬁrm becomes public it often stays public. We conjecture that this constraint would arise
endogenously in setups where the costs for a large ﬁrm of re-entering the stock market after
retiring all the stock would be very large, but we do not pursue this possibility in this
paper. Furthermore, there are legal limits and other barriers to repurchases. Imposing (5)
is therefore a relevant possibility.
Clearly, this inequality together with (4) implies that lim→∞ 

 + =0a.s. for







Equation (6) maps future dividends into today’s stock price in a standard way. Through-
out the paper, we call this relationship the price-dividend mapping or PD mapping.
As mentioned earlier, the fact that the manager recognizes that (6) constrains his choice
of investment is what distinguishes this paper from the literature. In previous papers on
dynamic corporate ﬁnance this relation is not written explicitly. More precisely, the papers
in the literature only introduce in the constraints of the ﬁrm the value of equity issued  ≡
 ( − −1) and the value of total dividend payments  = −1 without distinguishing
between  and  or  and . Moreover, the costs and frictions are also functions of  and .
I nt h i sc a s e ,w eh a v et h a t =(   ) and the budget constraint of the ﬁrm becomes:
 +  − (1 − )−1 ≤ (−1)+ − C( −1 )
Later on, we will discuss the conditions under which this is equivalent to our setting.
Finally, we would like to point out that the fact that ﬁrms consider the PD mapping as a
constraint in their feasible set corresponds to a standard deﬁnition of competitive behavior
under incomplete markets and rational expectations. This needs some more careful justiﬁca-
tion because, at ﬁrst sight, it might seem that there is an element of monopolistic behavior
7in the problem deﬁned above, since ﬁrms choose stock prices. But the fact is that a ﬁrm that
behaves competitively in the stock market should choose stock prices and dividends subject
to the PD mapping.6
To explain this point in detail let us build an analogy by considering two types of ﬁrms
who face slightly diﬀerent ﬁnancing environment as the ﬁrm considered above. First consider
a ﬁrm that has to ﬁnance investment under incomplete markets but the ﬁr mc a no n l yi s s u e
bonds of two diﬀerent maturities. Say, the ﬁrm can only issue short bonds that mature in
one period and long bonds that mature in  periods, for a given 1. Both are real
riskless bonds that pay one unit of consumption at maturity. Assume, for simplicity, that


















 are the corresponding bond prices. It should be uncontroversial to claim that a standard















.T h e ﬁrm chooses the total cost






 , but it is obviously behaving competitively
since it takes prices as given.
Suppose now that we change this model very slightly. In particular, let’s assume that the
ﬁrm issues  units of a portfolio of bonds. Investors can purchase units of this portfolio
from the ﬁrm, but the short or long bonds can not be purchased separately. Let us denote
the units of the short bond by  so that (1 − ) is the share of the long bond in each
portfolio. The ﬁrm can choose the share of long and short bonds  and it can choose
the amount of bond portfolios issued  each period. The ﬁrm sells each unit of portfolio
of bonds for a price . Let us call this a bond-portfolio-ﬁnancing (BPF) ﬁrm and let us
assume again there is no buyback of previously issued bonds.
In this setup the ﬁrm has to repay −1−1 short bonds plus (1 − −)− long
bonds in period  Assuming again there is no buyback of previously issued bonds, the budget
constraint of a BPF ﬁrm is
−1−1 +( 1− −)− ≤ 
 +  
A general equilibrium model will, in general, deliver that the following holds in equilibrium
 =  
1
 +( 1− )

 (7)
A natural deﬁnition of competitive behavior for a rational BPF ﬁrm would say that the








and it takes as given that (7) holds. The ﬁrm can choose
the share  and change the price of the portfolio  accordingly, but the ﬁrm behaves
competitively in the bond market because it takes bond prices and the mapping (7) as given.
In fact, the BPF ﬁrm is not doing anything diﬀerent from the ﬁrm issuing only long and short
bonds described above, it is just packaging the bonds diﬀerently. Equation (7) should then
become a constraint in the BPF ﬁrm’s problem and  would become a choice variable
in the ﬁrm’s problem. In other words, a rational BPF ﬁrm is behaving competitively by
choosing  subject to (7).7
6We have found that economists who are active in the ﬁnance or corporate ﬁnance literature ﬁnd the
assumption quite natural. On the other hand economists active in the macroeconomics literature sometimes
view this assumption as though we include an element of monopolistic behavior on the part of the ﬁrm. It is
to the later, that the following discussion is mainly addressed.
7To make an even more basic analogy: consider a competitive ﬁrm that produces two goods jointly. For
8The previous example shows that a BPF ﬁrm that took  as given, independent of ,
would behave rationally. By the same reasoning, a stock ﬁnancing ﬁrm that ignored how the
choice of future dividends inﬂuences today’s stock price would behave irrationally. Consider
now our setting. From a competitive equilibrium point of view a stock is a composite asset,
equivalent to a portfolio of many contingent claims that deliver a consumption good in
each future period and for each possible realization. The dividend () i st h ea m o u n to f
contingent claims that pay one unit of consumption at  if  occurs. The discount factor


 is the price of a contingent claim that pays one consumption unit in period  + 
in terms of period  consumption units By choosing a history of dividends , ﬁrms in our
paper oﬀer a diﬀerent composite portfolio  and ﬁrms simply understand how the market
values the diﬀerent elements of this asset. This is reﬂected in the fact that the price-dividend
mapping (6) is a constraint in the ﬁrms’ problem.
A similar reasoning has been used in the corporate ﬁnance literature before. Most notably,
the Modigliani-Miller theorem only works if ﬁrms understand how future dividends map into
the initial stock price and, therefore, into the value of the ﬁrm. More generally, the deﬁnition
of ﬁrms’ objective functions under incomplete markets proposed by Dreze (1974), Grossman
and Hart (1979) and recently by Bisin et al (2010) take for granted that a ﬁrm understands
(or conjecture) how their future dividend choice map into the current initial stock price.
As in the present paper, this literature also assumes that ﬁrms take the stochastic discount
factor as given. We simply extend the same reasoning to all periods and assume that when
the stock price appears in the ﬁrm’s budget constraint in period  (2) the ﬁrm understands
how this  is linked to future dividends.
2.3. Feasible Allocations. We state that a nonnegative sequence x =( ksdp) is
feasible if it satisﬁes
−1 ≤ 
 +  ( − −1) (8)

 ≡ (−1) −  +( 1− )−1 − C( −1 ) (9)
 = 1






for all  =0 1a.s. and the transversality condition (4) holds.8
One of the key diﬀerences between our setting and previous papers in dynamic corporate
ﬁnance is that due to constraint (10) future choice variables inﬂuence today’s feasible set.
More precisely, future dividends inﬂuence today’s value of equity and, therefore, today’s
investment. This means that standard dynamic programming does not apply and we have to
example, consider a winery that produces white and red wine. The winery sells bottles of red and white wine
in neatly packaged wooden boxes, 6 bottles in each box. The ﬁrm chooses how many bottles of red or white
wine go in each box. It would be natural to assume that a competitive ﬁrm should recognize that the price
of the box depends on how many bottles of each kind are included. The ﬁr mc a ni naw a yc h o o s et h ep r i c e
of the 6-bottle box, by choosing how many bottles of each kind are included, but this is compatible with
price-taking behavior since the ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e nt h ew a yt h a tt h em a r k e to fw i n ed r i n k e r sv a l u e sb o x e sw i t h
ad i ﬀerent number of whites or reds.
8Our formulation is consistent with stock splits being irrelevant. A stock split occurs in actual corporations
when a ﬁrm decides that each stock previously issued is converted into, say, two stocks. In this case each
shareholder will now receive half the dividends per share it would have received otherwise but it now has
twice as many shares. Stock splits are performed in the real world for accounting reasons and in a framework
like ours they should be irrelevant. In fact, we could introduce a stock split by assuming the ﬁrm can give 
shares for each previously owned share, then −1 should be replaced by −1 in the above budget constraint,
dividends, prices and future stocks would be divided by  and ﬁnancing costs and objectives are unchanged
by such an action. Our formulation of (8), however, does not introduce such a  It assumes that each old
share is always one old share, while newly issued equity ( − −1) is sold in the market and it is not given
out to former shareholders. Therefore we simply rule out stock splits.
9resort to other formulations in order to formulate the model recursively. A similar diﬃculty is
commonly found in the macro literature on Ramsey equilibria of optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy and models of risk sharing with dynamic participation constraints. Throughout the
p a p e rw ew i l lm a k ea n a l o g i e st ot h i sl i t e r a t u r et oc l a r i f yt h en a t u r eo ft h er e s u l t s .
We now discuss some features of the ﬁrms’ feasible set. The ﬁrst result rewrites the
period-by-period constraint (8) in a present value discounted form.9
Lemma 1. A non negative sequence  =( ) is feasible if and only if







for all  =0 1a.s.
The proof uses forward substitution in (8) and it is standard, except that one needs to
check that equation (10) also holds. This result will be useful in various parts of the paper
and it shows how incomplete markets restricts the ﬁrms’ choice. As is well known, if the ﬁrm
would have access to complete markets it would be enough to impose equation (11) only in
period  =0 ,n a m e l y







But in the presence of incomplete markets equation (11) has to hold for all  and all
realizations of uncertainty. This means that in addition to (38) the ﬁrm faces many more
constraints. These additional constraints are called measurability conditions and they are
stated precisely in the appendix. We discuss this in what follows with an example.
Consider the case of risk neutral investors  =1and no ﬁnancing costs C ≡ 0.G i v e n
any cash ﬂow n, a constant stream of dividends  =  =( 1− )0
P∞
=0  for all  does
satisfy (38) for the stock price  =  =  
1− and, therefore, () would be a feasible choice
if the ﬁrm would have access to complete markets. Indeed, this would be the optimal choice
if the manager would have a concave utility function depending on dividends. The budget






Clearly, if cash ﬂows are stochastic, the right hand side of this equation depends on
information up to , while the left side can only be chosen contingent on information up




 + −1−1, which gives an explosive solution for  and therefore is not feasible
(it violates the transversality condition of the investors) whenever cash ﬂows are stochastic.
Therefore, constant dividends is not a feasible policy under the sort of incomplete markets
that we consider in this paper, but it would be a feasible policy with complete markets.
Since we seek a theory of equity issuance and dividend policy we have to depart suﬃciently
from complete markets so as to break the Modigliani Miller result of irrelevance of ﬁnancial
policy. We already mentioned that we depart from complete markets in two ways: i) only
one asset is available to the ﬁrm (the ﬁrm’s own stock), ii) there are ﬁnancial frictions C.
The following proposition shows that i) alone is not enough to break the Modigliani-Miller
result.
9The proof of this lemma and of all the other results throughout the paper is provided in Appendix A.
10Proposition 1.A s s u m eC ≡ 0.






a.s. for all  is feasible.
2. For any k as in part 1. there are many feasible choices for the ﬁnancial variables
(dsp) that are compatible with k
3. The k that maximizes ﬁrm’s value is feasible.
This proposition establishes that in the absence of frictions the ﬁrm can eﬀectively com-
plete the markets by appropriately using ﬁnancial policy. Furthermore, many ﬁnancial
choices on equity and dividend are feasible for a given capital sequence. In other words,
the ﬁrst best that maximizes value can be achieved as under complete markets. One of the
implications of this is that in order to break the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result, we have
to assume that C 6=0and/or depart from the objective of value maximization.




 ( −1 ) (13)
where  is some given function  . The previous function encompasses many issues that
arise in corporate ﬁnance and ﬁrm ﬁnancing and it includes diﬀerent objective functions
that we will use in the examples throughout the paper. For example, we will look at a case
of internal versus external investors, a case with short termism of the manager and a case
where compensation includes stock options.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to choose x in order to maximize this function subject to (8)-(10)
and the investors’ transversality condition, taking −1 −1 and the processes for  as given.
Our solution assumes full commitment on the part of the ﬁrm to the preannounced policy,
since the ﬁrm decides in period zero what the solution will be in all future periods for any
possible contingency. Later on, we will show that if the manager could reoptimize in the
future, he would change the preannounced plan. The above ﬁrm behavior can be embedded
in a general equilibrium model in a standard way, namely, by assuming that the stochastic




Finally, note that we take  as given and thus avoid the issues of endogeneizing corporate
control as discussed in the literature on general equilibrium, incomplete markets and endoge-
nous production. This literature points out that the objective of the ﬁrm is not well deﬁned
in an incomplete markets setting and that heterogeneous stockholders will generally disagree
as to what should be the objective of the ﬁrm. In short, each shareholder has a diﬀerent
stochastic discount factor and each would like the ﬁrm to maximize the value of the ﬁrm
according to their own stochastic discount factor. Various alternatives have been postulated
in this literature to determine the ﬁrm’s objective and they postulate diﬀerent equilibrium
concepts (see e.g. Drèze (1974), Grossman and Hart (1979) and Bisin et al (2010)). In
this paper  is not endogeneized, but our analysis could be used in order to determine 
endogenously in a fully dynamic model by implementing the equilibrium concepts in the
literature.
113. Recursive Formulation and Time Inconsistency
Due to the presence of constraint (6) in the problem of the ﬁr m ,t h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o nd o e s
not hold and, in general, the optimal choice is not a time invariant function of the natural
state variables. Formally, denoting the optimal choice ∗
, there is no reason to expect
that ∗
 = (∗
−1 ) for some time invariant function 10. This happens in many other
models where future variables appear in the current choice set. Moreover, as pointed out by
Kydland and Prescott (1977), the solution is likely to be time inconsistent, in the sense that
t h es o l u t i o np r o m i s e db yt h eﬁrm in period zero is such that, if in a future period  the ﬁrm
is allowed to re-optimize, the decision will in general be diﬀerent from the optimum initially
promised.
The assumption of full commitment on the part of a ﬁrm manager may be a questionable
description of the way managers behave. Arguably, investors may not believe blindly what
ﬁrm managers state. Our focus on the full commitment solution is justiﬁable. First of all,
this is the ﬁrst best given the technology and ﬁnancial frictions, so that this will always be a
benchmark for any solution under some sort of partial commitment. Second, only by making
commitment an issue can we study how to build commitment in a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy.
As we will show later, depending on the objective function for the ﬁrm and the form of
ﬁnancial frictions, the optimal policy under full commitment happens to be time consistent,
and we can study what incentives the manager can receive to seek a time consistent policy.
Third, while full commitment may be a questionable assumption, any other assumption on
the commitment of the manager is also questionable. Perhaps managers do not fully commit
as in the solution studied in this paper, but managers certainly do not default constantly
on past promises, since this carries costs of various kinds. Given this, full commitment is as
good a place to start. 11
3.1. Recursive Formulation. We now show how the problem of the rational ﬁrm can
be written recursively following the approach of Marcet and Marimon (2009). To have a
general setting we assume that all the inequalities faced by the ﬁrm are summarized by the

















 + ( − −1) − −1 − C) − B]
where  and  are the multipliers associated with the period  budget constraint and the
non negativity constraints and  is the multiplier on the PD mapping (10). To obtain a
recursive Lagrangian, one has to rewrite the previous Lagrangian so that future variables do
not appear in the current return function. This can be achieved as follows. In the ﬁrst line
of the Lagrangian (the second line can stay as is), apply ﬁrst the law of iterated expectations





 ( −1 )+
¡
1




Then, we can introduce a new variable  with the following law of motion for  ≥ 0:
 = −1 +  with −1 =0 (14)
10Most commonly the state variables would not include −1 and −1. Given the general objective and
frictions discussed earlier, it could happen that those appear as natural state variables. See later for examples
where this is the case.
11SeeKlein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2007) or Domínguez (2009) for applications to ﬁscal policy under no
commitment and see Debortoli and Nunes (2008) for applications to government debt policy with partial
commitment.





 ( −1 )+−1 − 
+ (
 + ( − −1) − −1 − C) − B]
After rewriting the problem in this way it is clear that future variables do not enter
today’s objective function and that now only past ’s appear in the objective. This suggests






for a time-invatiant policy function  Marcet and Marimon (2008) provide conditions guar-
anteeing that this is indeed the case and they show a saddle point functional equation that
plays the role of the Bellman equation. This means that solving the model amounts to ﬁnding
a policy function  that satisﬁes either the saddle point functional equation or the ﬁrst order
conditions for optimality. There are various methods to ﬁnd this policy function numerically.
The key observation here is that  now becomes a state variable (sometimes called a co-state
variable) and that the multiplier  needs to be added to the list of decision variables. Given
the initial conditions −1 0 and adding the initial conditions 0 =1  −1 =0 ,t h i sp o l i c y
rule, together with (14), determines the whole optimal path.
Note that the multiplier −1 captures the promises that have been made in the past
about future dividends. Past promises bind the current choice for . Since there are no past
promises to be kept at the beginning of time, the optimal choice entails setting −1 =0 .
However, at  =1 , there is an inherited promise from period 0, ∗
0 = ∗
0, which summarizes
the cost of the promises made about future dividends. Since the ﬁrm is fully committed
to the optimal plan it will have to remember the promise made in all past periods about
today’s dividend payments, and this promise is summarized in the value −1. Similarly, as
we consider dividends further away in the future (2, 3 etc.), these are linked with promises
made in past periods. As reﬂected by its law of motion, the co-state −1 adds up all of
these past promises and summarizes them in a single number.
3.2. Time Inconsistency. In what follows, we discuss the issue of time inconsistency
that can potentially arise when ﬁrms are rational. Intuitively, the reason for time inconsis-
tency is the following. A ﬁrm that wishes to issue stock today will in general have incentives
to announce that it will postpone dividend payments. By paying a low dividend in the ﬁrst
period and by promising high future dividends today’s per-share stock price is higher and
more funds can be raised by today’s equity issuance. However, in future dates, after some
investors have already bought the ﬁrm’s stock, the manager will have an incentive to deviate
from the previously announced policy, namely, the ﬁrm will announce that today’s dividends
will be lower than had been promised, but that they will be higher in the future. This is
because adjusting today’s dividends will not aﬀect the current stock price, since it depends
only on future dividends. Thus, there is a permanent pressure to announce a temporary
reduction of dividends, relative to what had been promised.
To show this formally, we ﬁrst describe a standard deﬁnition of time consistency. De-
note the full commitment solution by ∗
. Given a time period 0 and a realization of







 (+ +−1 +) s.t.
(8)-(10) for all  ≥ 
given −1 = ∗
−1
13where  is now a function of histories of realizations from  to .T h i si st h es o l u t i o nt h a t
would arise if, having followed the full commitment solution up to time , the manager could
r e - o p t i m i z ea n dc h o o s et h eb e s ts o l u t i o nf r o mt hen on, ignoring the plans that were involved








a.s.. We say that the problem is time consistent if it is time consistent for all 0
Time inconsistency arises if the problem is not time consistent. The fact that time
inconsistency may arise in the present setup is reﬂected formally in the recursive formulation.
If the manager reoptimized in period , he would want to follow a policy that implies re-
setting −1 =0and following the optimal policy  from then on, since this is the solution to
the full commitment problem. But if the manager is fully committed to the pre-announced
policy, he will plug in ∗
−1 in the policy function .
Time inconsistency is usually seen as a source of instability. The full commitment solu-
tion can only be implemented if the manager can convince investors that he/she will indeed
follow the full commitment plan and that it will never reoptimize. In the presence of time
inconsistency, the manager will try to establish credibility that he will follow the full com-
mitment solution, but of course the temptation to default on past promises and to reoptimize
is very strong and it may undermine how the whole system works.
The method of Marcet and Marimon provides another way to express the problem of time
inconsistency and, at the same time, of discussing how the incentives of managers should
change in order to restore time consistency. In particular, Marcet and Marimon show that
the full commitment solution x∗ would arise as a solution of the reoptimization problem
if the objective function is modiﬁed appropriately. In our application this translates into













( + ) (15)
while all constraints stay as in the previous reoptimization problem. It turns out that the




=. In other words, if the manager was able to reoptimize but his incentives would
somehow change so that instead of caring only about  he would now care about a linear
combination of his own objective and the value of the ﬁrm, with a weight in the value of the
ﬁrm that is equal to ∗
−1∗
−1, then the manager would decide to maintain the previously
stated promises. This suggests a possible solution of the time inconsistency problem. The
objective of market investors should be incorporate gradually to the one of the manager.
This amounts to saying that investors’ preferences should play a larger role in older ﬁrms.
Such a compensation can be interpreted as an "optimal contract", in the sense that it would
eliminate the problem of time inconsistency.
In the next section, we analyze an example that demonstrates all the issues we have been
discussing.
3.3. Example 1: A Dominant Shareholder. In what follows, we consider an example
in which the manager owns a ﬁxed number of stocks in the ﬁrm and has no other sources
of income. Formally, assume that managers hold a (ﬁxed) number of stocks  and let the
stocks held by investors be given by 
, so that the total number of stocks in the economy
is equal to  = 
 + . The problem of the investors implies the PD mapping and their
consumption is equal to 
 = 
. Moreover, the consumption of the manager is equal to





for some increasing and concave utility function .
In general,  can be justiﬁed as the contract that the manager has been oﬀered to give
him or her incentives to manage the ﬁrm properly. In a setting in which the optimal payout
and investment are not observable, the manager is restricted from overinvesting or diverting
funds by linking his compensation to the payout. In other words, there may be a signalling
problem or hidden action mechanism in the background, that prompts the ﬁrm to oﬀer a
reward to the manager that is tied to the dividend. Indeed, many ﬁrms oﬀer stocks or options
as a form of payment to managers and managers are not allowed to sell these assets for a
long time. We concentrate on the optimal stock issuance policy given , but we can think of
 as a reduced form of an incentive problem that we take as exogenous here but that, ideally,
would be endogenized.
Another interpretation of this utility function is that there are two types of stockholders:
market stockholders and internal stockholders. Market stockholders would correspond to the
investors (households) in this setting. Internal stockholders are somehow tied to this ﬁrm,
either because they founded the ﬁrm, or because their human capital is particularly useful
in this ﬁrm; they run the ﬁrm and they decide how much to invest and how many stocks to
issue, while the utility () represents their direct preferences on the ﬁrm’s performance.
Consider the simple case where  =1and no ﬁnancing frictions C ≡ 0 The ﬁrst order
conditions for optimality imply:
0 ()=−1 − −1 (16)








 = ( − −1) (19)
The second and third equations represent the stock Euler equation (17) and the capital
Euler equation (18) respectively, which are fairly standard. The last condition is the ﬁrst
order condition for the stock price and it allows us to write the co-state as:
 = −1 + ( − −1) with −1 =0  (20)
We focus on the condition describing the optimal dividend choice (16). As we see, a
marginal increase in  yields a direct utility beneﬁto f0 () but it has a cost in terms of
lost resources at  that is equal to −1.Ar a t i o n a lﬁrm takes into account the fact that
the dividend choice at time  will aﬀect stock prices in all previous periods. In particular, a
marginal increase in  also implies increases in the stock prices of all previous periods and
this in turn aﬀects the resources available in previous periods. If the ﬁrm has been issuing
stocks we see from (20) that we can expect −1  0, implying that more funds were raised
in the past for the same level of stock issuance given a higher dividend at .C o n v e r s e l y ,i f
the ﬁrm has been repurchasing stocks in the past (−1  0), a dividend increase today has
a negative eﬀect on past resources. A fully rational ﬁrm needs to take into account all these
eﬀects when deciding the optimal dividend and equity issuance policies.
12Whereas this formulation assumes that the stocks of the manager are ﬁxed, he can change his proportion
in the ﬁrm by modifying the total number of stocks through issues and repurchases. Issues arising from the
trade of shares between managers and shareholders are also discussed in Gorton and He (2006). Their focus
is more on the interaction of agency issues and asset pricing and less on ﬁnancial policy and investment.
15Consider now a ﬁrm that ignores the PD mapping. Throughout the paper, we denote
this ﬁrm as naive. It can be easily checked that the ﬁrst order conditions of such a ﬁrm are
like the ones above but setting −1 =0in all periods. This shows how the naive ﬁrm will
ignore the links among the periods and it will, in general, achieve a lower objective value
than the fully rational ﬁrm.
The previous discussion clariﬁes again how the multiplier −1 summarizes the eﬀect of
a marginal change in  on all previous periods’ resources and it can be positive or negative
depending on the history of stock issuance and repurchase. Even though the whole past
history is needed to make decisions at any point in time , the recursive contracts formulation
of Marcet and Marimon allows us to summarize all the relevant information in just one
variable, −1. The nature of time inconsistency is that the ﬁrm will always be tempted to
follow a policy where  is re-set to zero and only the fact that the ﬁrm is fully committed
will prevent this from happening. Next, we provide an analytical version of the example that
compares the full commitment with the no commitment solution.
Full Commitment. We now analyze a version of the example above for which we can
obtain an analytical solution. In this example, the friction consists of a maximum amount
of stock that can be issued in the ﬁrst periods. This can be justiﬁed by the presence of
transaction costs or due to the manager disliking that too many stocks are distributed, since






−1 +  − (1 − )−1 = ( − −1)+(−1)





where  = 
 +  and ∆  0 is a ﬁxed constant limiting the amount of stocks that can be
issued. We assume that initial capital is much lower than the steady state capital. Formally,





a n dw ea s s u m et h a t−1  .
No Bounds on Stock Issuance: ∆ = ∞. In the absence of uncertainty, the ﬁrm
w o u l db ea b l et oa c h i e v et h ec o m p l e t em a r k e ts olution if the constraint on stock issuance
was not present. That is, if ∆ = ∞, the manager would be able to issue a suﬃciently large
amount of stocks in the ﬁrst period to ﬁnance the desired accumulation of capital at  =0 ,
achieving the ﬁrst best capital in one step. In fact, the manager would be able to complete
the markets with stock issuance so that  =  for all  ≥ 0 and dividends would be
perfectly smoothed. For the case with ()=l o g ( ) the analytical solution is provided below.
16Result 1. When ∆ = ∞, ()=l o g ( ) and −1  , the allocations are, for  ≥ 013:












−1 +( 1− )−1 − ¢
+ −1
 = ¯  =

¯ 




The proof of these results is provided in the appendix. The above allocations imply that
ﬁrms issue stocks in the ﬁrst period and invest enough to jump to the optimal level of capital
immediately. This implies that there is no time inconsistency. In what follows, we explore
the solution in the presence of a relatively tight bound ∆.
Bounds on Stock Issuance: ∆  ∞. Suppose there is a bound on stock issuance
∆  ∞. For any ∆  0, there is a point in time after which the bound is not binding any
longer. That is, capital has grown enough so that it is close to the steady state and one last
period of stock issuance (that does not violate the issuance bound) is enough to reach the
steady state. Suppose this happens after  periods. Then
 − −1 ≤ ∆ for 0 ≤  ≤  − 1
Starting at period  =  and given −1 and −1, the continuation problem is one where
bounds on stock issuance are not binding any more and the solution given by the one in
the previous section. The optimal policy for this setup turns out to be time inconsistent, as
shown by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. In a production economy with no uncertainty, bounds on stock issuance
for the initial  periods and initial capital lower than the steady state, the problem is time
inconsistent.
The previous proposition shows that the example with the issuance bound and risk averse
ﬁrms exhibits time inconsistency. This illustrates that a crucial factor generating time in-
consistency in the model is that there is disagreement between the shareholders and the
manager of the ﬁrm. It would be interesting to know how the ﬁrm would set its policy if
could not credibly commit. This is investigated in what follows.
No Commitment. We now compare the full commitment solution with the one that
would arise under no commitment. To simplify things, we assume that the bound is only
binding for one period  =1 . In this case, the solution for  ≥ 2 is the same as under full
commitment and it would have an identical path if the initial conditions were the same.
However, the solution for period  =1will diﬀer if the ﬁrm cannot commit. Since we do not
have an analytical solution, we have depicted the path for some of the endogenous variables
in the graph below. We consider a startup ﬁrm, that is, a ﬁrm that starts at a very low level
of capital, −1  .
Consider ﬁrst the solution under commitment. The ﬁgure reﬂects that the ﬁrm can
promise higher dividends in the future and lower dividends in the ﬁrst period, which allows
for higher stock prices and a higher growth. Note that the bounds on stock issuance are
binding in the ﬁrst period both under commitment and no commitment. However, if the
ﬁrm can credibly commit, it can obtain higher levels of external ﬁnance. In particular, by
promising lower dividends in the ﬁrst period and higher dividends in the future, it ensures
13See the appendix for details and for a comparison with the naive solution.
17that the competitive price for its stock is higher and thus its external ﬁnance is higher for
the same level of stock issuance.


































The ﬁgure also reﬂects that the dividend policy looks very diﬀerent if the ﬁrm cannot
credibly commit to the pre-announced policy. In this case, an increasing proﬁle of dividends
would not be credible and we see that dividends decrease over time. Intuitively, the ﬁrm will
have incentives to lower dividends in the future and promising an increasing sequence would
not be sustainable. Given this, the shareholders are compensated in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dw i t ha
higher dividend per share.
Two important implications arise from this comparison. First, the commitment solution
s e e m st ob em o r er e l e v a n te m p i r i c a l l y ,g r o w i n gﬁrms typically pay lower dividends when
young and more when mature. Second, our framework suggests that commitment is an
additional motive explaining this empirical observation.
Although time-inconsistency will arise in general in the presence of a constraint such as
the PD mapping, we can characterize some cases under which the solution is time consistent.
These cases are discussed in the following section.
4. Time Consistency
It should be clear that, in general, the solution is time inconsistent in the presence of a
constraint such as the PD mapping. However, time consistency can be recovered sometimes.
It turns out that this happens when the objective function of the manager depends only on
cash ﬂows net of ﬁnancing frictions, 
 = −1 −  ( − −1),n a m e l y ,
 ( −1 )= (−1 −  ( − −1) ) (21)
Propositions 3 and 4 characterize these settings.
Proposition 3: Let  ( −1 )= (−1 −  ( − −1) ) and deﬁne  0
 =
1 (−1 −  ( − −1) ). The full commitment solution is time consistent in period 
if either:
a) There is agreement between managers and shareholders, namely,  0
 = 
0.
b) The PD mapping is not a binding constraint until  Formally, −1 =0 
The proof of proposition 3 relies on showing that, when reoptimizing at period  = ,t h e
same prices and allocations can be supported with a suitable renormalization of multipliers
if conditions a) or b) are satisﬁed. Several remarks are worth noting. First, part a) of the
proposition holds if there is agreement between the managers and the shareholders. This
will arise under value maximization, which is a particular case of (21) that satisﬁes:
 (−1 −  ( − −1) )=
 Y
=1
 (−1 −  ( − −1)) = 
0 (−1 −  ( − −1))





0 [−1 −  ( − −1)] (22)
First, an important feature of the formulation in (??) is that it uses the PD mapping. To
see this note that the (cum-dividend) value of the ﬁrm at time  =0is given by (0+0)−1.
Using the PD mapping and the period by period budget constraint of the ﬁrm, we can then
re-write the value of the ﬁrm as follows:
(0 + 0)−1 = 
0 + 00 = 
0 + 01










0 (−1 −  ( − −1)) (23)
To make the point clearer, notice that a manager who ignored the price dividend mapping
and who literally maximized the value of the ﬁrm taking stock prices as given would treat 0
as outside of his control and decide that the optimum is to pay everything out as dividends
today and close down the ﬁrm in one period. A manager could only go from (0 +0)−1 to
(??) or (23) if he understood the link between future dividends and 0 every period.























Thus, the marginal rate of substitution of the manager is the same as the one of market in-
vestors at the optimum, who consume the net cash ﬂows net of ﬁnancing costs,  = 
.C o n -
versely, if  0
 = 
0, implying (24), then it must be the case that  ((−1 −  ( − −1)) )=

0 (−1 −  ( − −1)). It is in that sense that we identify value maximization with
agreement between managers and shareholders.
As for part b) of Proposition 3, also shows that agreement between the manager and
the shareholders is suﬃcient but not necessary for the solution to be time consistent. In
other words, time consistency can also arise under disagreement. An example of this case is
discussed in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4: If  ( −1 )= (−1  ( − −1) ) and frictions are sym-
metric, in the sense that they are of the form C =  ( −1  ( − −1) −1 ) and
B = B( −1  ( − −1) −1 ),t h e n =0for all .
The previous proposition states that time consistency will arise if both the compensa-
tion of the manager and the ﬁnancing frictions are symmetric. We label a compensation
or a friction symmetric if it aﬀects stocks and per share dividends equally or if they de-
pend on the total value of issuance  ( − −1) and/or the total value of dividends −1.
The most common example of a symmetric compensation is cash ﬂow compensation, since

 = −1− ( − −1). Examples of symmetric frictions are restrictions on repurchases,
 ( − −1) ≥ 0, issuance costs  ( ( − −1)) = [ ( − −1)]
 for  ≥ 1 or minimum
dividend payments, −1 ≥ 0. In contrast, examples of asymmetric frictions would be a
limit on the number of stocks issued,  − −1 ≤ ∆ per share dividend targets  ( − )

for  ≥ 1 or costs in changing per share dividends,  ( − −1)
 for  ≥ 1.
This result is particularly important, since the literature typically assumes symmetric
frictions and compensation linked to cash ﬂows. In fact, the literature has considered what






 ( −1  −  ) s.t.
 +  =  + (−1)+( 1− )−1 − C( −1   ) (DE)
0 ≥ B( −1   )
where  = −1 and  =  ( − −1). The proposition then shows that this problem is






 ( −1 −  ) s.t.







0 ≥ B( −1   )
An important implication of this equivalence is that the issues we discuss do not arise,
since the price dividend mapping is redundant. Note also that the DE problem is actually the
model considered by Gomes (2000) and Gomes at all (2003), who assume that  ( −1−
 )=
0 ( − ), a cost of issuing equity, a no repurchase constraint and a lower bound
on total dividends14. Proposition 4 shows then that these authors are justiﬁed in focusing on
the naive case. On the other hand, the solution displays the well known pecking order result,
implying that ﬁrms do not increase their dividend payments while they are issuing equity.
T h i s ,a n dt h ef a c tt h a tv a l u em a x i m i z a t i o nis not validated by the data leads us to study
other ﬁrm objectives that introduce a conﬂict of interest between managers and shareholders
and are more in line with the empirical observations on manager compensation. We do this
in the next section.
Finally, Proposition 5 below shows that one cannot ignore the PD mapping if frictions
are asymmetric, even under value maximization. In this case, it turns out that  6=0 . Our
second example illustrates this.
Proposition 5. If  6=0for some , then policies are diﬀerent if the PD mapping is
ignored.
4.1. Example 2: Value Maximization with Asymmetric Frictions. In this exam-
ple, we assume value maximization as in Gomes(2000) and Gomes et all (2003) but introduce
costs of changing per share dividends. This is intended to capture (in an admittedly crude
fashion) the observation that per share dividends are very persistent, in the sense that they
are very infrequently changed. This is an example in which the naive and rational solutions






 [−1 −  ( − −1)] s.t.
14Variations of this are analyzed in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Covas and Den-Haan (2007), Quadrini
and Jermann (2005) and Gomes et al (2003) amongst others.
20−1 = () −  +( 1− )−1 +  ( − −1)
−2
 ( − −1)
2 −  ( − −1)
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The time path for some of the endogenous variables in the model is displayed in the
ﬁgure below. For comparison, we also depict the solution for a naive ﬁrm that ignores the
PD mapping. As reﬂected by the ﬁgure, the two solution can diﬀer substantially. When
the PD mapping is taken into account, dividends are lower at ﬁrst and higher in the future,
leading to higher stock prices every period.
Figure 2: Value maximization with costs in changing dividends
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Stock Price and Dividends per Stock
The previous results illustrate that time consistency arises in very speciﬁcc a s e sa n di n
particular when shareholders are compensated according to symmetric payments, like cash
ﬂows, or when shareholders and managers agree, for example when the objective of managers
is value maximization. These are the standard assumptions in the literature. In the next
section, we show that small departures from these assumptions lead to time inconsistency.
We model these departures so that they reﬂect empirically observed CEO compensation
schemes. The ﬁrst one assumes that managers are compensated through bonus payments
linked to cash ﬂows and a ﬁxed salary, while the second assumes that compensation is based
on bonuses linked to cash ﬂows and stock options. In addition, we also study a case with
asymmetric frictions to illustrate the importance of Proposition 5.
5. Examples of CEO Compensation
This section studies speciﬁce x a m p l e st h a tr e ﬂect empirically observed compensation schemes.
For simplicity, all the examples throughout this section assume risk neutral households and
no uncertainty. The initial capital stock of the ﬁrm is lower than the steady state value,
which is reached after a ﬁnite number of periods . This implies that the ﬁrm is growing
over time. Given this, the role of stock issuance is, precisely, to provide funding to invest in
capital so that the ﬁrm can operate at the optimal level given by the golden rule. Since ﬁrms
will achieve the optimal capital immediately (after one period) in the absence of frictions,
we introduce such frictions.
According to the survey by Murphy (1999), the main components of CEO compensation
in US are (i) a ﬁxed part or base salary, (ii) a bonus mostly based on yearly performance, with
the most common measure being accounting proﬁts, (iii) stock options, which are typically
non tradable and now constitute the largest component of compensation in US and (iv) other
21forms of compensation, including restricted stock. Murphy also notes that stock options
have typically a strike price equal to the market value on date of grant and they reward only
price appreciation (no dividends). Following the evidence, the objectives we consider are
combinations of the diﬀerent components in (i)-(iv). We have already analyzed objectives
linked to cash ﬂows only (component (ii)), a special case of which is value maximization.
M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v es t u d i e daﬁrm objective that links compensation to per share dividends,
corresponding to component (iv). Next, we study a ﬁr mo b j e c t i v et h a tl i n k sc o m p e n s a t i o n
to cash ﬂows and stock options, corresponding to a combination of components (ii) and (iii)
and to cash ﬂows and a base salary, corresponding to combinations of components (i) and
(ii).
5.1. Example 3: Bonus Compensation with a Base Salary. We consider an ex-
ample with inﬁnitely many periods that can be solved analytically. We motivate the main
analysis from the point of view of a manager that has a shorter-term view than the investors.
But the analysis is obviously extendable to a case of two types of agents, the investors with a
higher discount factor than the manager. In essence this is a case where managers discount
more heavily the future, but it maintains all the standard assumptions of corporate ﬁnance
models, namely, the manager is rewarded according to cash ﬂow.15
The technology of the ﬁrm is as in the main text. There is no uncertainty, and cash ﬂows
are:
 = (−1) −  +( 1− )−1 (25)
In the absence of frictions, ﬁnancial policy is indeterminate. Therefore, we assume a bound
on issuance that determines the amount of stocks issued in the ﬁrst period 0,w h e r et h e
initial stocks −1 =0are normalized to zero for simplicity. As we will show later, the ﬁrm
will have no incentives to issue equity in subsequent periods.
Investors are risk-neutral, that is  =1  The manager has the same utility function as
investors, that is, the manager is risk neutral and has discount factor . The manager is
rewarded according to a ﬁxed wage and a bonus linked to earnings. So the payment for the
manager in period  is:
 + 
for ﬁxed constants  and  That the manager is rewarded in this way can be justiﬁed in
various ways. First, empirically, as manager’s compensation is often a combination of a
ﬁxed pay and a bonus linked to performance. Second, some papers on the optimal contract
literature ﬁnd that optimal incentives imply this kind of reward.
Each period, there is a probability 1− ≤ 1 that he will be ﬁred, in which case we assume
that it has a ﬁxed outside option  from then on. This setup would arise endogenously in
various ways, for example, i) the founding manager has invented the technology used in the
production of the ﬁrm, he is the only one who can run this technology initially and ii) with
probability 1 − , the stockholders ﬁnd how to manage the technology by themselves and
they can coordinate to ﬁre the manager. It is implicit that we only consider problems where
the value of the objective function for the manager is higher than the manager’s utility from
engaging in some other activity. The idea is the manager’s human capital is tightly linked
to this ﬁrm and he is much less productive working in some other activity. This guarantees
that the manager will stay as manager unless he is ﬁred.
The only uncertainty in the model is the ﬁring decision. As is well established, in
this case we can view the manager as choosing a deterministic sequence that maximizes





 +  +( 1− )¤










−1 =( 1 − ) −  +  ( − −1) (27)
 ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 (28)
For simplicity we assume that the ﬁrm itself fully commits to the preannounced dividend
policy, so that the dividend paid by the ﬁrm is the one chosen by the manager, regardless
of whether or not he has been ﬁred. Therefore the price satisﬁes the usual PD mapping for
the dividends chosen by the manager.
Denote by 

the optimal capital from the point of view of the investor, that is, for
1=(0(

)+1− ) Similarly let 

be the optimal capital from the point of view of the
manager, that is 1=(0(

)+1−) If the investors were to run the ﬁrm, capital would
be equal to 

in all periods, and if managers can invest free of any ﬁnancial constraint they
will choose capital 

in all periods. We make the usual assumption that:
(1 − )
Ã













that is, the value of the ﬁrm is be positive if capital would be accumulated according to
investor’s preferences. This assumption insures that the problem of the manager is well
deﬁned, since there is a positive stock issuance that is feasible if capital is accumulated
according to the investor’s preferences, so that the feasible set is non-empty.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the initial capital low enough that the initial cash
ﬂow is negative, so that the ﬁrm indeed needs some ﬁnancing to start growing. Clearly, there
is no reason to pay any dividends in the initial period, since this dividend does not yield
any return to the manager, so that the optimal choice is 0 =0 . In the following periods,
however, dividends will have to be positive in order to sustain a positive stock price.
Full Commitment. The solution to the problem under full commitment diﬀers in two
cases.






−  ≥ 0. This case insures that the value of the
ﬁrm from period 1 onwards is positive if the manager invests according to the investor’s
preferences. In this case the manager will implement his own ﬁrst best. The manager has to
invest a large amount in the ﬁrst period, for this he needs to issue some equity. The excess
production in periods  ≥ 1 is enough to guarantee future dividend payments insuring that
investors will pay a positive price for these stocks initially issued. In this case the fact that
equity has to be issued does not impose a cost on the manager.
This case arises for several parameter values: i) the technology of the ﬁrm is very produc-
tive or initial capital is quite high, so that it is worthwhile for investors to put their money
in this ﬁrm even if the capital is not accumulated according to their ﬁrst best, or ii) the
discount factor of managers and stockholders is in fact very similar (that is,  close to 1)
and in that case the manager chooses something close enough to the investors so that the
investors also have a positive value of the ﬁrm, or iii) manager compensation is low enough.




→∞ ,o ri f → 1 or if  → 0
23It turns out that in this case the manager implements the ﬁr s tb e s tf r o mt h ep o i n to f
view of his own discount factor and never invests according to stockholders’ preferences. To
see this, all we need to check is that implementing the manager’s ﬁrst best  = 

for all 
is feasible. To prove this we just need to ﬁnd sequences for stocks, dividend and prices that











(1 − ) − 
1 − 
(30)






(1 − ) −  for all  ≥ 1






− 0. In this second case, the manager does face
some constraints because he has to sell the new equity in the stock market. If the manager
tried to implement his ﬁrst choice for capital as he does in case 1, the budget constraint
w o u l dm e a nt h a t0 would be negative and, obviously, it would be impossible to raise any
funds from equity issuance. This case occurs for the contrary the parameter values i),ii),iii),
mentioned above, that is, when the technology is not highly productive, or when the manager
and investor are very diﬀerent or when the manager compensation is very high.
In case 2 the manager has a non-trivial choice, the investors’ preferences will now con-
strain his choice. Therefore, the manager will have to ﬁnd a compromise between his interests
and those of the investors.16 A summary of the properties of the solution is as follows. Cap-







showing that the manager has to ﬁnd a compromise between his and investor’s preferences.
That is, even if the investors do not run the ﬁrm the fact that they have to purchase the
newly issued equity forces the manager to invest somewhere in between his and the investors’




That is, capital now is increasing and it converges to the investors’ ﬁrst best. Capital
increases because this allows the manager to pay ever higher dividends that allows them






In this way the manager can guarantee that when capital stops growing he can pay
dividends that satisfy the investors, since in the long run capital is accumulated optimally
from the investors’ point of view. Hence, the manager can exploit the investment ﬁnanced
by the equity issuance by promising to ﬁnd a compromise, he will invest more than he would
like to and, in the long run, invest completely according to investor’s preferences.

















16There are many parameter conﬁgurations for which this can occur, so the case is not vacuous. To see












 so for any technology and
discount factors there are many values f , for which Case 2 arises.
24where  is the lagrange multiplier of (??)a n d the multiplier of (??). FOC with respect to
capital, dividends, and price give:





for  with a law of motion
 = −1−1 + ( − −1) for all  ≥ 0 and −1 =0
It is clear that the following solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition. We set 0 equal
to the bound on issuance, which is chosen to be equal to 1 for simplicity. Thus, 0 =1 .S e t










Notice that given a value for 0  0 (34) gives a solution for the whole capital series k∗.
Clearly the large bracket is always larger than one, it increases with  and it converges to
−1 as  →∞  This implies, respectively, (31), (32), (33)17
Therefore, if the manager can not implement his ﬁrst best he will initially accumulate
less capital than 

but in the long run capital will be set according to investors’ preferences.





0 is closest to 

when the budget constraint is very tight so that the manager really is in
need of external ﬁnancing (i.e., when the lagrange multiplier 0 is very large) or when the
manger has very diﬀerent preferences from the investors’ ( is very low). To solve the model
one has to ﬁnd 0 such that the capital series implied by (34) implies an initial value of the













The solution for stocks, prices and dividends that satisﬁes all budget constraints is as






















budget constraints and PD mapping hold. In principle, we would need to check that the non-
negativity of dividends is satisﬁed. But we consider a case that ∗




1](1−)−0 and, therefore, that all later dividends
are positive as well. This will occur whenever 0 is suﬃciently high so as to guarantee a
quick jump to the investors’ ﬁrst best. In this case, it is also clear that there is no need for
equity issuance beyond the ﬁrst period.
17Obviously, we could have analyzed Case 1 from this analysis. In that case the budget constraint is not
binding so that 0 =0implying  =0for all  Then the large parenthesis in the FOC for capital disappears
so that investment is done according to the manager discount factor. But in the current case the budget
constraint is binding therefore 0  0.
25Time Inconsistency. Now we have to consider the choice that the manager would
make if he could reoptimize in period  If this choice is diﬀerent from the one planned in
period zero under full commitment we say there is time inconsistency. Using the results in
Marcet and Marimon (2009), we see that the full commitment solution amounts to reopti-
mizing at time  the problem:
∗
−1 = ∗
0−−1 we see that the full commitment solution amounts to reoptimizing at












where we have substituted for ∗
−1 = ∗
0−−1, subject to all the constraints. In other words,
the problem can always be seen as one of meeting the interests of two agents who have a
discounted utility, they both care about a common good and have the same instantaneous
utility (namely ) but they have diﬀerent discount factors. These agents receive diﬀerent
weights, initially the weight (1−) on the manager and ∗
0−1 is the weight on the investor.
As time goes by, the full commitment solution amounts to increasing the weight given to the
investor at an exponential rate equal to −1.
I ns h o u l db ei n t u i t i v et h a ti nC a s e1t h ef u l lc o m m i t m e n ts o l u t i o ni st i m ec o n s i s t e n t .
There is nothing to gain from defaulting on past dividend promises if the manager can always
implement his own ﬁrst best and he will pay the dividends promised at time  because he
does not loose anything from paying them. Interpreting this in terms of the problem (37)
the objective function that would deliver the full commitment solution is just the objective
function of the manager that reoptimizes his own utility, because in case 1 ∗
0 =0 ,r e ﬂecting
the fact that in this case there is time consistency.
On the other hand, in case 2 ∗
0 6=0so the objective function that should be reoptimized
in order to obtain the full commitment solution gives some weight to the investors and it
is diﬀerent from the one that the manager would maximize if he chose his own ﬁrst best
at . Intuitively, what will happen is the following. Recall that the manager had promised
to increase capital to make it closer and closer to the investors’ ﬁrst best and, therefore,
further and further away from his own ﬁrst best. Therefore, if the manager can reoptimize,
his interest is to "rearrange things" so as to lower capital. The exact level of capital will
depend on the value of the capital at reoptimization time ∗
−1 but in general reoptimization
means that the manager will default on the promised prices and dividends and reset capital
to a lower value than he had promised. The following ﬁgure displays the evolution of the
aggregate capital and per share dividend payments under full commitment and in the event
of a reoptimization.
The upper panel of the ﬁgure displays the aggregate capital stock and the lower panel
displays the evolution of the dividend payments. The two solid lines represent the optimum
for the manager (black line) and the shareholders (blue line). As already explained earlier,
the manager suﬀers from short termism and wants to invest less than the market investors.
If he implemented his optimal investment, however, he would have to pay negative dividends
and no one would provide ﬁnancing to the ﬁrm. Given this, he has to compromise and choose
a path of capital that converges to the optimal capital of the shareholders in the long run.
If the manager is allowed to reoptimize, however, it will choose the lowest possible capital
stock that allows him to obtain external ﬁnance. This will imply paying positive dividends
in the period in which he reoptimizes and zero dividends from then onwards.
The nature of time inconsistency is clear. In period 1, the founding manager will be
tempted to renege on promises to stock holders. He will be tempted to pay lower dividends
and lower the value of the ﬁrm in the future. These lower dividends allow him to invest
even less than had been promised. Even though the full commitment solution had lower
26than optimal investment, the investment under reoptimization is even lower. This allows the
manager to have a higher payoﬀ at the time of reoptimization.
Figure 3: Evolution of Capital and Dividends








































5.2. Example 4: Bonus Compensation and Stock Options. We now consider a
third alternative objective representing the case where managers are compensated through
stock options and cash ﬂows18. In particular, we assume that managers receive one period
options every period at the ﬁxed strike price , which is chosen so that the options are
exercised every period. We introduce costly equity issuance and a target for total dividend





 [−1 −  ( − −1)+m a x( 0   − )] s.t.
−1 = () −  +( 1− )−1 +  ( − −1)
−2
 ( − −1)
2 −  (−1 − )
2




The following ﬁgure displays the evolution of some of the key endogenous variables.
Qualitatively, the story here is not any diﬀerent than in the previous examples. The rational
manager pays lower dividends at the beginning and higher dividends in the future, a strategy
which allows him to obtain a higher external ﬁnance and grow faster. In fact, the naive
18This is the case that is most closely related to the empirical observation on CEO compensation. Recall
that the three main components of CEO compensation are bonuses (linked to cash ﬂows), stock opitons and
base salary. We omit the base salary component since it makes no qualitative diﬀerence.
19T h ep r e s e n c eo ft h em a xo p e r a t o ri nt h eo b j e c t i v ew o u ld in general complicate the maximization problem
considerably. We sidestep this issue by ensuring that the option is optimally exercised every period so that
the max operator can be ignored.
27manager here acts as if there was no stock option component in their compensation since
they take prices as given. Naive managers would follow the value maximizing policy while
rational manager exploit their decision making power in order to inﬂate the stock price and,
hence, their own compensation.
Using this example, we also attempt to illustrate the nature of time inconsistency. We do
this by considering the possibility of deviation in period  =2 : After the manager has chosen
investment and ﬁnancial policy for all the future under the assumption of full commitment,
we consider what he would change if he were given the opportunity to re-optimize at  =2 .
At that stage, past choices have already been realized and the manager inherits some levels
of capital stock 1and number of outstanding stocks 1. He also inherits promises made
about ﬁnancial policy in the past (in the form of a positive 1), but is allowed to renege on
those and set 1 =0 .
Figure 5: Compensation linked to cash ﬂows and stock options
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As we see. The deviation in dividend policy is clearly aimed at raising stock prices 2
and 3. The way this is achieved is by lowering current dividends 2 which do not aﬀect
these prices and promising higher dividends in the future (). By raising stock prices, the
manager can raise external ﬁnance without too much dilution (3 is less under the deviating
policy) and also grow faster (2 is higher under the deviating policy). As a result, he
can deliver the promised higher dividends per share. Clearly the manager is better oﬀ by
deviating which means the commitment policy is time inconsistent.
6. Conclusions
We have provided a way to formulate and solve a stochastic general equilibrium dynamic
model of dividend and stock policy. The aim was to provide a framework within which
a number of important issues can be addressed. The model proposed makes explicit the
distinction between dividends and stock issuance or repurchases. It is thus well suited to an-
alyze payout policy. In addition, the framework is also available for the analysis of questions
regrading the interplay between payout policy and investment.
As a ﬁrst implication of the theoretical analysis presented in the main section of this pa-
per, we highlight the behavior of growing ﬁr m sw i t hr e g a r dt od i v i d e n dp a y m e n t s .T y p i c a l l y ,
startup ﬁrms pay little or no dividends, while they funnel resources towards the available
productive projects that lead to ﬁrm growth. One obvious theoretical explanation of this
observation points at ﬁnancial frictions that do not allow for unlimited funds being raised
from external sources. Our framework provides another, complementary mechanism that
can explain this observation. The idea is that young ﬁrms lack the burden of past promises
about dividends and can therefore pay little now, while promising a lot of dividends for the
future. This strategy allows them to raise external funds at more favorable prices by inﬂating
the price of their stock. Using the cheaper external funds, they can also grow faster.
28Our framework also provides a rationale for why a ﬁrm would prefer to use dividends
as opposed to repurchases if the full commitment solution is taken as the benchmark case.
As mentioned above, the reason is that dividend promises can be used to inﬂuence prices
towards achieving cheaper external ﬁnance, while the same objective cannot be achieved
through announcements in stock repurchases.
Finally, our work identiﬁes a potential for time inconsistency in ﬁnancial policy even in
the absence of asymmetric information of the type considered by Miller and Rock (1985). We
point out the complications arising from the need for commitment and we provide examples
where the full commitment policy is time consistent and others where it is not.
The examples under which optimal policy is time consistent assume that there is agree-
ment between managers and shareholders or that the compensation of managers only consists
of bonuses linked to cash ﬂows. In general, when these assumptions are broken, optimal pol-
icy is time inconsistent.
One of the examples where policy is time inconsistent assumes that shareholders and
managers have diﬀerent discount factors. In this case we assume that the ﬁrm acts to
maximize the value according to the discount factor of an agent diﬀerent from the market
investors that purchase the stock each period. Since the ﬁrm insures that the PD mapping is
satisﬁed, investors are still willing to hold the stock even though the ﬁrm pursues a diﬀerent
objective from the one of the investors. Such setup is quite natural for ﬁrms with a group
of core shareholders who inﬂuence closely the decisions of manager but funds are collected
from external shareholders. Another scenario assumes that internal shareholders’ income is
directly related to the proﬁts distributed by the ﬁr m . W ea s s u m ea ne x t r e m ec a s ei nt h a t
internal shareholders are bound to not sell or buy part of the stock (perhaps to retain control
of the ﬁrm and to insure that he stays on as a manager) and they can not save. In this case
the consumption of internal shareholders is proportional to the cum-share dividends. In
ad i ﬀerent example, we consider an objective function that represents the most common
empirically observed CEO compensation by assuming that managers are compensated with
bonuses linked to cash ﬂows and one period stock options.
The examples illustrate that time inconsistency would arise in general and that it could
be an important aspect in determining the availability of equity ﬁnancing for ﬁrms.
29APPENDIX A: PROOFS
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
To prove Lemma 1, consider a non negative sequence x that satisﬁes (8)-(10), together
with the transversality condition of investors. Clearly, the period by period budget constraint
in (8) together with the PD mapping imply:







To see this, we only need to use the PD mapping and substitute forward (+++)+−1
for  ≥ 1. To prove the converse, we show that given (11), the budget constraint of the ﬁrm
in (8) and the PD mapping are satisﬁed. To see this, note that:




































 [(+1 + +1)]
= 
 + 1
 [(+1 + +1)]
Now deﬁne  = 1
 [(+1 + +1)].T h i s s a t i s ﬁes the PD mapping in (??)a n di t
implies that the period by period budget constraint is satisﬁed, since ( + )−1 = 
+.
Note that Lemma 1 can also be stated as follows: A nonnegative sequence  =( )















is measurable with respect to information up to  − 1 for all 0 (39)














In contrast to a framework in which markets are complete, Lemma 1 implies that the pe-
riod by period budget constraint of the ﬁrm is not equivalent to the period zero consolidated
budget constraint in (38). Under incomplete markets, the measurability conditions (39) also
need to be satisﬁed.20 In other words, while many dividend sequences satisfy (38), not all
of them are feasible. To prove this version of the Lemma, ﬁr s ti ti se a s yt os e et h a tt h e
period-by period constraint in (8) and the price Euler equation from the consumers’ problem
20The proof of this part follows closely the reasoning of Proposition 1 in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and
Seppala (2002).
30in (10), together with the no Ponzi scheme assumption, imply (38), (39). It is easy to see
that the latter imply:







where we have used the price dividend mapping to substitute forward (+ + +)+−1
for  ≥ 1. Since this holds for all  ≥ 0, the equation evaluated at  =0implies (38). In
addition, using the deﬁnitions of  and ,e q u a t i o n( ??)i m p l i e s
 = −1 so that (39) is
satisﬁed.
To prove the converse, we show that given (??), (39) and (6), we can construct a sequence
of stock holdings such that (8) is satisﬁed. First, deﬁne  ≡ 
 so that  is measurable









 +  [+1+1]
But +1 is measurable with respect to information up to ,s ot h a t = 
++1 [+1].
Finally, noticing that  =  + , we see that period-by-period budget constraint in (8) is
satisﬁed for −1 =  = 
.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Lemma 2 directly follows from Lemma 1. Part 1 is straightforward. By Lemma 1, a
sequence k that implies non negative discounted cash ﬂows implies a positive value for the
ﬁrm and it is therefore feasible.
T op r o v ep a r t2 ,c o n s i d e ras e q u e n c ek that implies non negative cash ﬂows and let the
cash ﬂow sequence be given by {}
∞
=0. Consider any choice of stocks {e }
∞
=0 such that
e  6=0a.s.. Consistent with this choice of e  we can ﬁnd the associated price to satisfy the
following equation:





















Now we have to show that such a stock, price and dividend processes satisfy budget
constraints and pricing equations. First, notice that:
























Using the deﬁnition of e e −1 + e e −1 we also have that





e +1e  + e +1e 
´´
so e  cancels out and the PD mapping holds. It is easy to see also that the above choices
satisfy the period by period budget constraint of the ﬁrm. We can ﬁnd many other equilibria
by changing {e }
∞
=0.¥
P r o o fo fR e s u l t1 .





s.t. −1 =  ( − −1)+
−1 +( 1− )−1 − 
 =  (+1 + +1), −1 −1 given








−1 +( 1− )−1 −  − −1
¢¤








1 −  + −1

¢
 =  (+1 + +1)
−1 =  ( − −1)+
−1 +( 1− )−1 − 
 = −1 + ( − −1)
We provide an analytical solution to these conditions. The stock Euler together with the
price equation imply  = +1 so the stock Euler implies







just like under naive ﬁrms. Using the fact that  = −1 for all  ≥ 1 and the dividend ﬁrst
order conditions we have
0() − 0(−1)=−1 − −1 − −1−2 + −2
=(  − −1)−1 =0
so  = −1 for all  ≥ 1. The constant dividend level is found from the time 0 budget
constraint




−1 +( 1− )−1 − ¢
+ 
−1
for  ≥ 0
Given that, we can use the period 0 dividend ﬁrst order condition to ﬁnd  :
 = 0 =
0(¯ )
−1
and the price is also constant and equal to  =  = 
1−
¯ . We can now compute the stocks
from the intertemporal budget constraints for  ≥ 1







−1 =¯  =

¯ 
for  ≥ 1






−1 +( 1− )−1 − ¢
+ −1  −1
as long as −1  . Finally, the multipliers  are constant after period 0 and equal to 0
 = 0(¯  − −1)  0 for  ≥ 0¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
The ﬁrst order conditions for the time 0 problem are given by:
 = −1 + ( − −1) with −1 =0
0()=−1 − −1
along with
 = +1(0()+1− )
 = −1 +(  +1 ) ∆ for 0 ≤  ≤  − 1
We now consider whether a re-optimization in future periods would lead the ﬁrm to
deviate from the dividend plans announced in period zero. We use the superscript  to
denote the solution if the ﬁrm re-optimizes in period  =1 . The conditions for capital and

























Suppose that the re-optimization choices are the same as the original ones, i.e. 
 = 

 =  and 
 =  for  ≥ 1. We now show that this leads to a contradiction. If the
re-optimized choices are the same as originally, the following must hold
0(1)=
1 0 (41)






In addition, for these choices of  to be compatible with the same choice for capital in period




but this cannot happen. In fact, if (42) holds, we have 
2 = 
1 − 1 + 2 so that we need
the following to be true

1 = 
2 (0(1)+1− )=( 
1 − 1 + 2)(0(1)+1− )
=( 
1 − 1)(0(1)+1− )+1
33The last expression can only be equal to 
1 if either (0(1)+1− )=1or 
1 = 1.
The ﬁrst condition arises when capital is optimal, a case which gives rise to time consistency
as shown in Proposition 3 below, but which we have excluded above by the choice of a low
initial capital and an upper bound on issuance ∆ that is binding for at least two periods
(period 0 and 1). The second case can be excluded by the formulae for 
1 in (41) and for
1 in the original problem, since 0 6=0 . Therefore the re-optimized solution cannot be the
same as the original one and the time zero policy is time inconsistent in this example.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .




 [−1 −  ( − −1) ]
s.t.







B( −1  −1  −1  −1) ≤ 0
The Lagrangian is:


















B( −1  −1  −1  −1)
1 = 1−1 + 2
Let  0
 = 1 [−1 −  ( − −1) ], C =
C(−1−1−1−1)
 and B =
B(−1−1−1−1)
 where  stands in for any of the arguments of C and B.T h e
FOC are:
















 −  0

¢






+1 −  0
+1
¢
+ +1C+1 + +1B+1 + +1
¡
+1 −  0
+1
¢¤
2 =(  − −1)
¡
 −  0

¢




1 = 1−1 + 2
the last two can be used to get rid of 2
1 = 1−1 +(  − −1)
¡
 −  0

¢




34We now show that the problem is time consistent in period  if either i) 1−1 =0or
if ii)  (
 )=
0
 or  0
 = 













solve the above problem given −1 −1 −1 −1 1−1 =0and consider reoptimization at







possibly diﬀerent from ∗
1−1
¢
.W e w i l l


























































for all  ≥ , satisfy all the ﬁrst order conditions of the reoptimization problem as long as
 0
 = 
0. Clearly, the capital FOC is satisﬁed for the same allocations since all multipliers
are simply divided by a constant which can be cancelled out. Plugging the above relationships
































































































Using the PD mapping, this is clearly true if  0
 = 
0 so the stock euler is also satisﬁed.
We need to show also that the 1 law of motion and the dividend FOC are satisﬁed in
the re-optimization problem. The dividend FOC is satisﬁed by choosing ∗∗
1 appropriately.





































































































































35This renormalization of multipliers, although it delivers the right result, is not really feasible


























































































































































This last condition is true if either ∗
1−1 =0or  0
 = 
0.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
To prove proposition 2, we ﬁrst establish the equivalence between the DE and the OP






 ( −1  ) s.t. (43)







where total dividends  and new equity  are deﬁned as
 ≡ −1 (46)
 ≡ ( − −1)
Notice that given constraint (44)  −  =  − C are cash ﬂows. We now prove the







} is recursive in the natural state variables ( −1 −1) In particular, it





















} coincides with the solution to the problem of the naive manager







 ( −1   ) s.t. (47)
 +  − (1 − )−1 =  + (−1) − C( −1  ) (48)
We ﬁrst prove the following.
a Given a sequence {  } that is feasible in the original problem we can ﬁnd { }
that satisﬁes (46) and that is feasible in the DE problem for the same  series.
b Conversely, given {  } that is feasible in the DE problem we can ﬁnd a { }
that satisﬁes (46), and that is feasible in the original problem for the same  series.
Part a) follows immediately from choosing { } that satisﬁes (46), plugging the results
in (44) and observing it satisﬁes the only constraint in DE problem. For part b), given
{  } we build a process { } in the following way: ﬁrst build the series of cash
ﬂows:

 ≡ (−1)+( 1− )−1 − C( −1  ) − 
Then build { } recursively as follows. At any period  ≥ 0 given −1 and the process
{  } ﬁnd (  ) for a given realization as follows:

















With this solution we get  and can construct (+1 +1 +1) and so on. It is clear that
in this manner one can build a whole process {  }.N o ww eh a v e
























 (+1 + +1) (53)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that the process so constructed satisﬁes (49)
and (50), the second equality uses the law of iterated expectations and simple algebra and
the third equality uses (52) for period  +1inside the expectation. On the other hand we
have
( + )−1 =  −  +  = 
 + 
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (46) and the second from the deﬁnition of cash ﬂows.
This together with (53) implies that:
 = 1










37so that (45) is also satisﬁed. In sum, all the constraints of the OP-problem are satisﬁed for
the series that satisﬁes (49) to (51) and this proves part b).
Now note that given a sequence {  }, for the feasible sequence { } that is




 ( −1   )=0
∞ X
=0
 ( −1 −1 ( − −1) )
The same holds for any feasible sequence {  } and the corresponding sequence
{ } that is mentioned in part b). This is because, in both cases,  = −1 and
 = ( − −1). Therefore the maximum value of the original problem coincides with the
maximum value of the DE problem. Formally, letting {∗∗
  ∗∗
 ∗∗
 } denote the solution of
the original problem and let {∗
 ∗
 ∗



















Now it is clear that the solution to the DE problem is recursive in the standard dynamic
programming sense, since only past values of  (in addition the shock ) constrain the feasible





−1) for all  a.s. (54)
for some time-invariant policy function  : 2 → 3.
This means that the sequence {  } corresponding to {∗∗
 ∗∗
 ∗∗
 } according to
part b) of the results mentioned above achieves the maximum in the original problem. Since
this corresponding { } sequence satisﬁes (49) to (51) then it is clear that for any  the
variables ( ) are a function of (∗∗
 ∗∗
 ∗∗
 ) and also of ∗
−1, therefore, combining (49)






for a time invariant function . This proves part 1 of the proposition.
For part 2, consider the case where the manager reoptimizes at time  taking as given the
"initial" state variables (∗∗
−1 ∗
−1). We simply state that by a similar argument as above
the reoptimized original problem is equivalent with the reoptimized DE problem. Since the
DE problem satisﬁes a standard Bellman equation this problem is time consistent and the
reoptimized series for  coincides with the original optimum announced at time zero for





=  It is clear that the corresponding  series would also
coincide with the preannounced one, so there is time consistency.
For part 3 of the proposition, note that the naive problem simply does not take into
account (45) as a constraint. This means that the optimum of the DE problem is consistent
with a series  that satisﬁes all constraints in the naive problem, since this problem
simply has one fewer constraint than the original problem, namely (45). Therefore the
maximum of the OP-problem is also the maximum of the naive problem.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
We now show that the naive solution () is equal to the rational solution () iﬀ  =0
for all .F i r s t ,i f∗
 =0for all , then the  and  fOC are the same. Conversely, suppose
that {    }
∞
=0 solve the  problem so that





0()+1−  − C+1
¢¤
0= 0




 −  0

¢
− C = 1
 +1
¡








+1 −  0
+1
¢
38Suppose that the same {   }
∞
=0 solve the rational problem, that is
































 −1 − 
 C − 1
 
+1C+1 + 1−1
1 = 1−1 +(  − −1)
¡





 C − 
+11
 C+1







 for all . Using the two dividend fOC and




















0−1 =0  Assuming  0
0 6=0 ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
0 = 0.
By the previous condition, this also implies 
 =  for all . As a result, from the  dividend
ﬁrst order condition for any , it must be that  =0 .¥
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